ABSTRACT Lossy trapdoor functions (LTFs) are very useful tools in constructing complex cryptographic primitives in a black-box manner, such as injective trapdoor functions, collision-resistant hashes, CCA secure public-key encryption, and so on. However, the trapdoor is very sensitive in lossy trapdoor function systems, and the attacker can obtain partial sensitive information of trapdoor by the side-channel attacks, which leads to not only the leakage of sensitive information but also the impossibility of provable security. In this paper, we present the new model of updatable lossy trapdoor functions in presence of consecutive and continual leakage-resilient, to provide a more efficient mechanism in solving the sensitive trapdoor leakage problem in LTF systems. Our contribution has threefold: 1) we give the definition and model of consecutive and continual leakage-resilient LTFs, and provide the concrete construction to achieve the lossiness of 50%; 2) using the proposed LTF scheme as a primitive, we present a updatable public-key encryption in the presence of consecutive and continual leakage-resilience, in which the leakage of secret key can occur during the updates that can simulate the real leakage scenarios; and 3) We provide a secure application deployment in sensitive-data revealing environments that employ the proposed CCLR-PKE scheme as a building block, in which a side-channel analyzer might obtain some sensitive information by controlling the secret channel, watching the private memory and detecting the algorithm executing and so on.
I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUNDS
The notion of lossy trapdoor functions (LTFs) was first proposed by Peikert and Waters in STOC'08 [17] , in which there exist two modes in lossy trapdoor functions: injective mode and lossy mode. In the regular injective mode, computable functions are injective and invertible with a secret trapdoor. In the lossy mode, functions statistically lose information about their inputs. Moreover, the two modes are computationally indistinguishable.
LTFs can serve as black-box building blocks within more complex primitives, such as regular injective trapdoor functions, provably collision resistant hashing, and public-key encryption with chosen-ciphertext security etc [4] , [5] , [9] , [17] , [18] , [23] , [25] . In the injective trapdoor function f (·), a party with a trapdoor can invert the function. However, inversion should be infeasible for any attacker without the sensitive trapdoor [17] , [18] , [20] . Let n(λ) = poly(λ) represent the input length of the function and (λ) ≤ n(λ) represent the lossiness of the collection. The residual leakage r(λ) = n(λ) − (λ). The larger lossiness of r(λ), the harder inversion of function.
Actually, in the injective mode, the image of lossy trapdoor function can be efficiently inverted to obtain the preimage using the sensitive trapdoor. Thus the trapdoor is very sensitive in the lossy trapdoor function system. However, the trapdoor are usually stored in the memory, and the attacker can gain the partial sensitive information of trapdoor by the side-channel attacks, which leads to not only the leakage of the information but the impossibility of provable security [16] , [19] , [23] , [24] , [26] .
In order to keep the sensitive trapdoor in the memory secretely, we divide the memory into two parts: public memory and private memory. Public memory can store the public key, system parameters, and the inputs and outputs of the computation. Private memory is used to store the sensitive information such as secret key, secret randomness and seed, and the intermediate value in the computations. We allow the attacker to watch the contents of public memory, while is allowed to gain a limited amount of sensitive information in private memory for a period, which simulates the actual side-channel attacks.
To avoid the attacker to gain entire information in private memory, we introduce a refresh mechanism to update the secret information which is called continual leakage resilience(CLR) [23] , [24] . In continual leakage-resilient schemes for trapdoor function, encryption or signature schemes, secret trapdoors/keys will be updated periodically and thus the attacker can only gain at most a bounded leakage between two updates, while keeping the public key same. When the secret trapdoors/keys are updated then the secret trapdoors/keys must be re-randomized to recover enough min-entropy. Otherwise, the attacker can obtain some future secret trapdoors/keys, bit-by-bit, via its leakage in each time period to obtain entire secret information [2] , [3] , [6] , [7] .
In order to simulate the leakage, we define a leakage oracle. The attacker can gain the (bounded) sensitive information by querying the leakage oracle. Each time, say in the i-th query, the attacker provides an efficiently computable leakage function f i 1 whose output is at most µ-bit, 2 and the challenger chooses randomness r i , updates the secret trapdoor/key from td i−1 to td i , and gives the attacker the leakage response i = f (td i−1 ).
In the traditional continual leakage model [6] - [8] , [10] , [11] , [14] , the leakage attack is applied on a single trapdoor/key, and the leakage oracle responds with i = f i (td i−1 ) (the input of leakage function is only associated with trapdoors or secret keys). In the continual leak-on-update model [1] , [13] , the leakage attack is applied on the current trapdoor/key and the randomness used for updating the trapdoor/key, i.e., the leakage oracle answer the leakage with i = f i (td i−1 , r i ). Consecutive continual leakage was first presented by Dachman-Soled et al. [12] , in which the leakage is defined by two consecutive secret key, e.g., i = f i (td i−1 , td i ). Obviously, in the consecutive leakage model the attacker can query the secret trapdoor information about two consecutive trapdoors, i.e., previous (un-updated) trapdoor and updated trapdoor.
Since the side-channel attacks arise as a huge threat for cryptographic schemes than previously realized, the emergence of leakage-resilient cryptography has led to constructions of many cryptographic primitives which can be proven secure even against attackers who obtain limited additional information about secret trapdoors/keys and other internal states. Our contribution in this work is listed as follows:
1) We give the definition and security model of consecutive and continual leakage-resilient LTF (namely, CCLR-LTF in short), in which the inputs of the update algorithm are associated with both previous leakage and current trapdoor which simulates the real trapdoor online update environments. We provide the concrete construction of CCLR-LTF scheme. Analysis indicates that our proposed scheme achieves approximate 12.5% leakage rate. Also, we present the performance analysis such as leakage bound, leakage rate, lossiness, and the sizes of system parameters, trapdoor, evaluation key, and output of function etc. 2) Using the proposed CCLR-LTF scheme as a primitive, we present a updatable public-key encryption in the presence of consecutive and continual leakageresilience. In our updatable public-key encryption system, the leakage of secret key can occur during the updates. At the end of each time-period, we ''update'' or ''refresh'' the secret key, in which the update is a randomized procedure that takes as input a secret key sk corresponding to a public key pk, and outputs a uniformly random secret key. 3) We give a secure scenario that deploys the CCLR-PKE scheme as the building block. In our deployment, we allow a side-channel analyzer that can monitor the system to obtain some sensitive information by controlling the secret channel, watching the private memory and detecting the algorithm executing and so on.
C. APPLICATIONS IN SENSITIVE INFORMATION REVEALING ENVIRONMENTS
We show the practical applications in the presence of consecutive and continual sensitive leakage. Traditionally, in the distributed cloud systems, the key generator will distribute the secret key for the user via a secure channel, and the secret key will store in the private and secret memory so that the attacker can not read the memory. Also, after encrypted by a sender, the ciphertext will send to the receiver via a public channel. During the decryption, the receiver will perform the decryption algorithm using the secret key and the ciphertext as inputs. However, when the decryption algorithm are executing, the algorithm must be performed in a blackbox manner, i.e., the attacker can not watch or debug the performing since the secret key and intermediate states are sensitive.
In our sensitive information revealing environments, we assume that there exists a side-channel analyzer, which can monitor the system to obtain some sensitive VOLUME 6, 2018 information leakage. In this case, the side-channel analyzer is able to monitor the secret channel, watch the private memory and detect the executing algorithm etc. We give the restriction that the side-channel analyzer can obtain at most µ-bit sensitive information in one period, and at the end of this period the secret key will be updated. 1 demonstrates the scenario for our scheme in secure data transmit in side-channel attack environments, even the side-channel analyzer can obtain a limited sensitive information leakage by side-channel attacks. By the experiment test in Section III-C, we allow the side-channel analyzer to obtain approximative 45K-bit leakage in one update period in the setting l = 96, and we can achieve more allowable leakage when enlarge the parameter l.
D. PAPER ORGANIZATION
In Section II, we give the preliminaries and mathematical primitives. We present the concrete construction of CCLR-LTF and provide the security and performance analysis in Section III and, using CCLR-LTF as a primitive, we propose the updatable public-key encryption against consecutive and continual leakage-resilience in Section IV, respectively. Finally, we draw the conclusion in Section V.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
Throughout of this paper, we use λ to denote the system security parameter. We say that a function β(λ) is negligible in security parameter λ if for all polynomial ploy and sufficiently large β(λ) ≤ 1/poly(λ).
We use the bold caption to denote a matrix, and use Rank d (Z n×m q ) to denote a random n-by-m matrix over Z q of rank d. We let [n] to denote the set {1, 2, · · · , n}, and [n, m] to denote the set {n, n + 1,
If x ∈ L the corresponding r is called a witness for x, and (X , L) forms a subset membership problem [21] , [23] .
Definition 1 (Statistical Distance): Let X and Y be two random variables in a finite set Z. The statistical distance between X and Y is defined as:
Definition 2 (Trapdoor Function): Let n = n(λ) = poly(λ) denote the input length of the trapdoor functions. A collection of injective trapdoor functions is given by a tuple of algorithms TF = (S, F, F −1 ) having the following properties:
• (Easy to sample, compute, and invert with trapdoor): Algorithm S outputs (v, td) where v is a function index and td is its trapdoor. Algorithm F(V , ·) computes an injective function f V (x) over the domain {0, 1} n and algorithm
V (·) using a trapdoor td.
• (Hard to invert without trapdoor): for any p.p.t inverter I, the probability that I(f V (x)) outputs x is negligible, where the probability is taken over the choice of (V , td) ← S, x ← {0, 1} n and I's randomness.
Definition 3 (Extended Diffie-Hellman Assumption):
The extended Diffie-Hellman assumption states as:
it is hard to distinguish the following two distributions:
where r, r 1 , · · · , r n ∈ Z q . Clearly, for the exponent matrices formed in above distributions, the rank of valid extended Diffie-Hellman tuple is 1, and the rank for invalid tuple is 2.
Naor and Segev [21] indicated that the Diffie-Hellman assumption is equivalent to the assumption in distinguishing between an n-by-m matrix X with rank i and one with rank j > i in the exponent of a generator g of group G.
Definition 4 (Rank Hiding Assumption, RHA [7] ): Let Rank i (Z n×m q ) be the uniform distribution on all n-by-m matrices over Z q of rank i. The rank hiding assumption requires that, for any p.p.t attacker A, we have
The Diffie-Hellman assumpiton is an instance of X ∈ Z 2×2 q in distinguishing rank 1 and 2. Namely, in Diffie-Hellman assumption, the tuple is a valid DDH tuple if Rank(X) = 1 and is invalid tuple if Rank(X) = 2.
In this paper, we want to use the fact that under the rankhiding assumption, random rank-2 matrices in the exponent are indistinguishable from random rank-3 matrices.
Definition 5 (Extended Rank Hiding Assumption, eRHA [1] ): The extended rank hiding assumption implies that, for any p.p.t attacker A, we have
where i, j, m, n ∈ N s.t. j > i and t ≤ min{n, m} − max{i, j}. Definition 6 (Strong Random Extractor [15] ):
where Seed is uniform in {0, 1} t and U Y is uniform over distribution Y. Lemma 1 (Generalized Crooked Leftover Hash Lemma [15] ): Let the family H = {H k : X → Y} k∈K is a universal hash family. For any two random variables X , Z and k ∈ K, we have
The leftover hash lemma implies that any universal hash function is a good extractor: For two random variables X and Y , a family of universal hash functions {H k : X → Y} k∈K is an average-case (m, )-strong extractor Ext :
It is straightforward to prove (via a hybrid argument) that statistical and computational indistinguishability are transitive under polynomially-many steps.
A. LEAKAGE-RESILIENT SUBSPACES
In order to obtain consecutively continual-leakage resilience, we consider the following two distributions of random subspaces are indistinguishable. i.e., for arbitrary and adaptively chosen functions
where V i s are the kernel of X, and U i s are the uniformly selected vectors with the same length of V i s.
Note that every chosen function f i can be determined after seeing the previous outputs of f 1 
We give the security for the above random subspace under extended rank hiding assumption defined in 5 when constructs the scheme in ECC groups.
Lemma 2 [1] , [7] , [21] : Let n, l, t, d ∈ N, s.t. n ≥ l ≥ 3d, and q be a prime. Let A ∈ Z t×n q , X ∈ Z n×l q s.t. A · X = 0, and U ∈ Z n×d q be a kernel of matrix A (i.e., A · U = 0). Let T , T be the matrices in Z l×d
We write the kernel of matrix A as ker(A). The above lemma 2 is a result of generalization of the Crooked Leftover Hash Lemma [15] , [26] .
Lemma 3 [12] : Let H : K × D → R be a hash function family, and (K , Z ) be joint random variables over distributions (K, Z) for the set K and some set Z. Define the set
where U |Z =z and U |Z =z denote two independent uniform distributions over R conditioned on Z = z, and
Then for any set S and any function f : R × Z → S, we have
B. MODEL AND SECURITY OF CONSECUTIVE CONTINUAL-LEAKAGE RESILIENT AND UPDATABLE LOSSY TRAPDOOR FUNCTIONS
In this section, we first give the definition of lossy trapdoor functions with key update, and then provide the security requirements for the consecutive continual leakage resilience, whose framework is desecirbed in Fig. 2 . 
Definition 7 (Lossy Trapdoor Functions with Key Update):
A collection of (d, k)-lossy trapdoor functions with key update consists of five algorithms: CCLR-LTF=(G, S, F, F −1 , U), such that:
• G(1 λ ): The parameter and trapdoor generation algorithm takes in the security parameter λ and outputs the public parameter pp and a trapdoor td. VOLUME 6, 2018 • S(pp, b): The sample algorithm takes in the public parameter pp and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and samples an evaluation key ek. The evaluation key is called injective when b = 1 and lossy when b = 0.
• F(ek, x): The evaluation algorithm takes as input the evaluation key ek and an input x ∈ {0, 1} n , and outputs the image y.
• F −1 (td, y): The inversion algorithm takes as input the image y and the trapdoor td, and outputs the pre-image x ∈ {0, 1} n or a failure symbol ⊥.
• U(td): The update algorithm takes as input the trapdoor td and outputs a updated and re-randomized trapdoor td . The CCLR-LTF scheme holds the following properties: 1) Correctness of the evaluation. A correct image y evaluated by an injective evaluation key can recover the pre-image x by a trapdoor: For all (pp, td) ← G(1 λ ), ek ← S(pp, 1) and all x ∈ {0, 1} n , it requires that F −1 (td, F(ek, x)) = x. 2) Trapdoor sample. It is easily to sample an injective function with the trapdoor, and however, it only can sample a lossy function publicly without trapdoor. 3) Consistency of trapdoor update. It requires that, for all pp and evaluation key ek, the updated trapdoor td can also recover the pre-image x of y correctly geneated in the injective mode. i.e., 
where the interactive experiment is defined as follows: Exp
where t = poly(λ) is polynomial in λ.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF CONSECUTIVE CCLR-LTF
A. THE SCHEME Let G and G 2 be two multiplicative groups of prime order q such that there exists a bilinear map e : G × G → G 2 . Let g be a generator of G, and e(g, g) be a generator of G 2 . The construction of CCLR-LTF=(G, S, F, F −1 , U) is given as follows.
• G(1 λ ):
1) Run the bilinear group generator to create group • S(pp, b): 1) Given b ∈ {0, 1} and pp, and let
where L is a language of decisional DiffieHellman problem.
in Eq. 13, as shown at the top of the next page. 4) Output ek = g V . Remark 3: It is easily to verify that, when b = 1 and l ≥ 2n, it is in injective mode since the matrix V is fullrank, i.e., Rank(V ) = 2n. When b = 0, it is in lossy mode and the rank of matrix V of 2n × l is n. Remark 4: The lossiness is n in the lossy mode.
• F(ek, x): On input an evaluation key ek = g V of function index V and an input x = x 1 x 2 · · · x n ∈ {0, 1} n , and compute the image of x as F V (x) = y = (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n ), where
where U ∈ Z 2×l q is a uniformly random matrix.
• F −1 (td, y): 1) At first parse td = g Y and y = (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n ).
2) For i ∈ [n], compute
e(y i , td) = e(g, g)
• U(td):
1) Input a trapdoor td = g Y ∈ G l×2 , at first sample a random full-rank matrix R ← Rank 2 (Z 2×2 q ) with degree 2. 2) Compute td = g YR . Remark 5: The trapdoor update operation is performed by ''rotating'' the matrix Y : Sample a 2 × 2 full rank matrix R, and set the new trapdoor to g Y R .
B. CORRECTNESS, CONSISTENCY AND SECURITY
We give the analysis of correctness, consistency and security for the scheme in this section.
• Consistency of trapdoor update. The updated trapdoor is td = g YR . In the evaluation of F −1 (td , y) using the updated trapdoor td , e(y i , td ) = e(g, g) • Correctness of evaluations of F and F −1 . Without loss of generality, we let n = 1 and thus, log g ek
Consider the exponent of trapdoor td,
The evaluation value of F is F(ek, 0) = ek for input x = 0, and the value is random when x = 1.
• Indistinguishability of injective/lossy trapdoor. It is hard to guess b = 0 or b = 1 given (g
). It is easily to obtain that the security of deployed in ek scheme can be reduced into the linear assumption, and thus distinguishing lossy mode from injective mode is reduced to differ b in linear assumption defined in 3. i.e., SD( 0 , 1 ) ≤ β(λ), where (18) where td 0 = g Y and td i is the updated trapdoor from td i−1 using random R ← Rank 2 (Z 2×2 q ) in the trapdoor update algorithm.
Intuitively, the distribution 0 is the view of the attacker given an encryption of 0 as the challenge ciphertext and consecutive continual leakage of the trapdoor. 1 is the same except the challenge ciphertext is an encryption of 1. Our goal is to indicate that no p.p.t attacker can distinguish between them.
Theorem 1: Suppose that the decisional linear assumption holds, for every lï£¡ ≥ 7, the CCLR-LTF scheme is µ-bit leakage resilient against trapdoor consecutive and continual leakage, where
trapdoor leakage bound
lossiness bits in lossy mode (19) Proof: At first, we set the trapdoor td as td i ← ker 2 (A), instead of using a rotation of the current trapdoor, the update procedure re-samples two random points in the kernel of A. That is,
for g Z is sampled either from g R A or g U . Intuitively, the operations are computed in the exponent, so the attacker can not distinguish between the modified experiments from the original ones under the decisional linear assumption. We continue to modify the b into b where
where the distribution samples a random matrix X ∈ Z
). Finally, it samples Z either as R A or uniform random matrix. It is easily to demonstrate that SD( 0 , 1 ) ≤ β(λ), which means that 0 and 1 are indistinguishable. If the attacker A can distinguish 0 from 1 with non-negligible probability, then we can breaks the decisional linear assumption with the same probability.
We now calculate the performance of leakage bound µ, leakage rate ρ and lossiness bits lb in lossy mode. Let X be a random matrix in Z l× (l−3) q , and T and T be the two matrices with rank 2 in Z · λ −ω (1) . The leakage bound is
Then the leakage rate ρ,
In the construction of ek for lossy mode, i.e., b = 0, the rank of matrix V is n. We note that the matrix V is a 2n × l and l ≥ 2n. Thus the lossiness bits in lossy mode is lb = 2n − n = n.
Remark 6: It is easily to see that, the larger parameter l, the more allowable leakage bound and higher leakage rate.
Remark 7: Since l ≥ 2n, the larger l, the more allowable lossiness of the scheme.
C. PERFORMANCE
We give the performance analysis of our scheme. We perform the performance under standard NIST AES-128 bits security. In this AES-128 security, for the bilinear groups, the size |G| = 1024-bit and |G 2 | = 2048-bit. In our construction, we have l ≥ 7. In order to obtain an optimized lossiness bits in lossy mode, we let n = l/2. Fig. 3 shows the relationship between leakage bound µ and parameter l. It indicates that the scheme can tolerate about 45K-bit trapdoor leakage when l = 100. 4 shows the leakage rate for our scheme. The theoretical leakage rate is at most 12.5%, and the experimental results demonstrate that the leakage rate is beyond 10% when l ≥ 30. 5 describes the relationship between lossiness bits in lossy mode of LTF and parameter l, and it shows that the lossiness is linear to the parameter l in the scheme. Fig. 6 indicates the performance of pp, td and ek, and it is easily to see that the larger parameter l the larger sizes of pp, td and ek. Fig. 7 gives the evaluation size of y under the size n of input x. 
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF CONSECUTIVE AND CONTINUAL LEAKAGE-RESILIENT PKE
In this section, we first give model and definition of consecutive and continual leakage resilient public-key encryption (namely, CCLR-PKE), and then present the concrete construction that employs the proposed CCLR-LTF scheme as a primitive.
A. MODEL OF CONSECUTIVE CLR ENCRYPTION

Definition 9 (Updatable Public-key Encryption):
A updatable public-key encryption consists of four algorithms described as follows:
• KeyGen(1 λ ) → (pk, sk 0 ): This algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a public key pk and an initial secret key sk 0 .
• Enc(pk, m) → ct : This algorithm takes as input a public key pk and a message m and outputs a ciphertext ct.
• Dec(sk i , ct) → m|⊥: This algorithm takes as input a secret key sk i and a ciphertext ct, and outputs a message m if decryption succeeds and a failure symbol ⊥ otherwise.
• Upd(sk i−1 ) → sk i : This algorithms takes as input a secret key sk i−1 and outputs a updated key sk i corresponding to the same public key. In the key-leakage resilient case, the attacker can launch a polynomial number of key-leakage queries. Each time, say in the i-th query, the attacker provides an efficiently computable leakage function f i whose output is at most µ-bit, and the challenger C chooses a randomness r i , updates the secret key from sk i−1 to sk i , and answers the attacker the leakage output i .
There have two types of models on continual leakage:
• Traditional continual leakage model. The leakage attack is applied on a single secret key sk i , and the leakage answer is defined as i = f i (sk i−1 ).
• Continual leak-on-update model. The leakage attack is applied on the current secret key sk i−1 and the randomness r i used for updating the secret key, i.e.,
Definition 10 (Continual Leakage Resilience):
A public key encryption scheme is said to be µ-continual leakage resilient (respectively, µ-CLR secure with leakage on key updates) if any p.p.t attacker only has a negligible advantage wins the IND-CPA experiment even it has access to leakage oracle to gain at most µ-bit secret key.
Security notions in terms of interactive experiments involving an attacker algorithm A. The view of the attacker in such an experiment is the ensemble of random variables, where each variable includes the random coins of A and all its inputs over the course of the experiment when run with security parameter λ.
Definition 11 (Consecutive CLR Encryption): Let PKE = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Upd) be a updatable public-key encryption scheme. The PKE scheme is said to be µ-leakage resilient against consecutive continual-leakage if any probabilistic polynomial-time attacker A only has a negligible advantage Adv CCLR A (λ) in the interactive experiment game between a challenger C and an attacker A, described as follows:
• Setup: The challenger C calls PKE.KeyGen(1 λ ) to generate the initial secret key sk 0 and the corresponding VOLUME 6, 2018 public key pk, and sends pk to the attacker A. Note that no leakage is allowed in this phase.
• Query: The attakcer A launches an efficiently computable leakage function f i whose output is bounded by a parameter µ. The challenger C updates the secret key (changing it from sk i−1 to sk i ), and then gives the leakage output f i (sk i−1 , sk i ) to the attacker. Actually, A can repeat this query for a bounded polynomial number of times.
• Challenge: A provides two message m 0 and m 1 as the challenged plaintexts. C tosses a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and then sends the encryption Enc(pk, m b ) of m b as the challenge ciphertext to A.
• Response: Finally, the attacker A outputs a bit b as the guess of random coin b, and wins the game if b = b. Clearly, the leakage occurs during the refresh of the key, that is, the input of the leakage function is taken over the current key sk i−1 and the updated output key sk i . In the above experiment, the attacker can only query the leakage of secret key. A public-key encryption scheme is said to be semantically secure in the presence of continual secret-key leakage if the advantage of the attacker A is negligible in security parameter λ.
B. TRANSFORMATION AND CONSTRUCTION FROM CCLR-LTF
Let CCLR-LTF = (G, S, F, F −1 , U) be a updatable lossy trapdoor function against consecutive and continual trapdoor leakage. A CCLR-PKE public-key encryption scheme is presented as follows.
• CCLR-PKE.KeyGen(1 λ ): On input a security parameter 1 λ , call CCLR-LTF.G(1 λ ) to generate (pp, td), and set (pk = pp,sk = td).
• CCLR-PKE.Enc(pk, m):
• CCLR-PKE.Dec(sk, ct):
• CCLR-PKE.Upd(sk): Output CCLR-LTF.U(sk). Remark 8 In our transformation and construction, the ciphertext ct is created in injective mode, which means that the ciphertext is invertible under some secret key (trapdoor in LTF). The lossiness mode in algorithm Enc is only used to implement the security proof. Concretely, a valid ciphertext (injective mode) is indistinguishable from an invalid ciphertext (lossiness mode).
Assume that CCLR-LTF be a updatable lossy trapdoor function against consecutive and continual trapdoor leakage. The construction of CCLR-PKE is a semantically secure publickey encryption with secret key update in the presence of consecutive and continual secret-key leakage.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we provided the definition and security model of consecutive and continual leakage-resilient lossy trapdoor functions. The function family equipped with a update algorithm that takes as input both previous trapdoor leakage and current trapdoor, which can simulate the real online trapdoor update environments. We presented the concrete construction for the updatable lossy trapdoor function, and analyzed the leakage performance such as leakage bound, leakage rate, trapdoor lossiness etc.
Taking the proposed consecutive and continual leakageresilient LTF as a building block, we presented a updatable public-key encryption in the presence of consecutive and continual leakage-resilience, in which the leakage of secret key can occur during the updates. Also, we gave a secure application deployment in sensitive-data revealing environments in which there exists a side-channel analyzer to obtain some sensitive information by monitoring the secret channel, watching the private memory and detecting the algorithm executing etc.
In 
